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Abstract—Much of the technical literature on spectrum 
sharing has been on developing technologies and systems for 
(non-cooperative) opportunistic use. In this paper, we situate this 
approach to secondary spectrum use in a broader context, one 
that includes cooperative approaches to Dynamic Spectrum 
Access (DSA). In this paper, we introduce readers to this broader 
approach to DSA by contrasting it with non-cooperative sharing 
(opportunistic use), surveying relevant literature, and suggesting 
future directions for research 
 
Index Terms— Cognitive radio, Economics, Radio spectrum 
managements, Spectrum markets,  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the emergence of wireless communications in the 
1920s, governments have regulated the allocation and 
assignment of spectrum because it was seen as a scarce public 
resource.
1
 Demand for spectrum access rights exceeds the 
available supply. At the same time, measurements of spectrum 
suggest that, in most bands, spectrum is being underutilized 
[1]. Although the quantity of radio frequency spectrum is 
fixed, the available supply could be significantly expanded by 
dynamically sharing the spectrum more intensively.  
 Technologies that enable more dynamic spectrum sharing 
(e.g., smart antennas, software defined radios, new modulation 
schemes, etc.) may be utilized by service providers to increase 
the spectral efficiency of their licensed spectrum use.
2
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1 We distinguish between spectrum allocation and spectrum assignment. 
Spectrum allocation is the process of associating an application with a 
frequency band (e.g., FM radio to 88-108MHz). Spectrum assignment is the 
process of granting a specific usage right to a specific user in a specific 
location (e.g., 91.3MHz to Pittsburgh Community Broadcasting Corporation 
to operate an FM radio station in Pittsburgh at 18 KWatts). Allocation 
decisions are governed by a set of non-technical parameters (such as 
international agreements and social goals) as well as technical ones. 
Assignment decisions are governed by political, economic and institutional 
factors. As a result, it is useful to separate these types of decisions. This paper 
will be focussed on spectrum assignment. 
2 For example, the migration to 4G LTE from 3G will result in significant 
improvements in spectral efficiency that will allow mobile operators to share 
their licensed spectrum much more intensively among a larger number of 
users. Such operator-mediated spectrum sharing, using spectrum managed by 
such enhancements are on-going and important, in this paper, 
we focus on mechanisms for sharing spectrum among users 
directly and across wireless network infrastructures and access 
rights regimes.   
Several approaches have emerged to improve dynamic 
access to spectrum for new (and existing) users and service 
providers.  These include license-exempt sharing, cooperative 
sharing and license trading. 
License exempt sharing is possible in certain dedicated 
"unlicensed" bands such as the ISM 2.4 and 5GHz bands used 
by 802.11 WLANs, cordless phones and other types of devices 
subject to Part 15 rules. License exempt use has also been 
approved for secondary usage by low power ultrawideband 
devices and, more recently, for higher power opportunistic 
secondary use sharing of TV bands [2]. Opportunistic systems 
allow users to temporarily use spectrum when the primary user 
is not.  Typically, these systems require some kind of sensing 
technology to find idle spectrum and to vacate spectrum if the 
primary user begins using it again. Cognitive radios have 
emerged for this kind of use. In both cases, the license-exempt 
users have secondary usage access rights, which means that 
they are constrained to operate in such a way as to avoid 
interfering with the primary access rights holder. The low 
power mode of operation is sometimes referred to as a 
spectrum "underlay" because such secondary use devices are 
expected to operate below the noise floor of the primary user. 
The higher power, opportunistic mode of sharing anticipated 
for the TV band "white spaces," is sometimes referred to as an 
"overlay" since the secondary user's access rights are overlaid 
on top of the primary user so as to exploit opportunities when 
the primary user is not actually utilizing the spectrum.   While 
license-exempt usage – whether in dedicated unlicensed or on 
a secondary usage basis – provides a valuable opportunity for 
dynamically sharing spectrum, it does not allow the license-
exempt user to reliably control or predict the level of 
interference that may occur. 
Another approach to sharing is cooperative sharing, where 
the primary and secondary user agree on terms and conditions 
of sharing (i.e., what frequencies, what time periods, what 
prices). This kind of cooperative, contract-based sharing is 
already seen with mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs), 
                                                                                                     
a single network operator (e.g., spectrum licensed for exclusive-use to the 
operator), will likely utilize many of the same techniques and technologies 
that market-based sharing will employ, and this approach may prove to be the 
dominant business model for managing the more intensive sharing of 
spectrum. 
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who use licensed spectrum through negotiation (see [3] for a 
further discussion).  
Finally, it is possible that secondary markets for licenses 
may emerge. A sufficiently liquid market would make 
dynamic spectrum reassignment possible.  
Table 1 illustrates a taxonomy for the modes of dynamic 
spectrum sharing. The term “non-cooperative” in this table 
means that there is no coordination among users beyond what 
might be implicit in the medium access control (MAC) 
protocol. In the secondary sharing case, it means no 
coordination between the primary and secondary users 
although there may be coordination between secondary users 
via a MAC protocol. The “sharing” dimension refers to 
spectrum rights, with primary sharing being peer-based and 
secondary sharing hierarchical. That is, in primary sharing, all 
users have equal status whether they are sharing the same 
spectrum (as in non-cooperative use) or exchanging usage 
rights (as in cooperative use). Secondary sharing assumes a 
primary user (i.e., a license holder) and then addresses 
different means by which idle spectrum may be used without 
exchanging de jure usage rights (i.e., licenses). 
 
 Non-cooperative Cooperative 
Primary sharing Unlicensed (eg. 
WiFi, Bluetooth) 
Secondary 
spectrum markets 
Secondary 
sharing 
Easements, 
opportunistic use 
Cooperative 
sharing 
Table 1 - A taxonomy of dynamic spectrum assignment 
Much of the attention in the technical literature has been on 
non-cooperative approaches to spectrum sharing. Unlicensed 
use has been an important technical and economic approach to 
spectrum access that has been highly visible in the product 
market. Because unlicensed users must share the same RF 
bands, these systems suffer from unpredictable interference, 
which may result in a poor or unpredictable quality of service 
(QoS)  or channel capacity . While this is acceptable to some 
users for some applications, it will clearly not meet all 
communications needs. As a result, we see calls for unlicensed 
use as a more general strategy for spectrum management [4], 
which basically increases the spectrum available for dedicated 
unlicensed use. This has the effect of spreading existing users 
over more bands (i.e., increasing SINR) and increasing the 
(aggregate) channel bandwidth. 
While some spectrum managers may be sympathetic to the 
idea of increasing the allocation for dedicated unlicensed 
usage, such a reassignment and/or reallocation presents 
significant political, economic, and regulatory challenges.
3
 
The emergence of cognitive radios [5] (CRs) gave rise to the 
possibility of non-cooperative secondary sharing, which offers 
 
3 Reallocation/reassignment of spectrum access rights confronts many 
challenges. First, incumbent users/uses must be relocated. Second, because 
spectrum access rights are scarce, there are multiple stakeholders seeking to 
secure rights and they often disagree on the best regime for newly reallocated 
spectrum (e.g., exclusive licensed or unlicensed, license terms, auctions, etc.). 
Third, selecting a protocol and rules for unlicensed usage in a new allocation 
(e.g., will it be preemptible? How will it be shared? Etc.) is also likely to be 
contentious. Overcoming these obstacles is a multidisciplinary challenge. 
an alternative way to expand unlicensed usage [6]. Some 
aspects of these systems are described elsewhere in this 
special issue. 
Cooperative spectrum sharing is rooted in the seminal ideas 
of the Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase, who argued 
that scarcity, by itself, does not call for government regulation 
[7]. He went on to argue that the problem was a lack of clear 
property rights in spectrum. In a property rights regime, he 
argued, efficient allocation and assignment of spectrum could 
be achieved through the use of price mechanisms. While 
Weiser and Hatfield [8] have argued that property rights in 
spectrum pose challenges that are not found in tangible goods, 
the notion that approaches to spectrum assignment that are 
based on economics has taken hold in spectrum management 
authorities around the world. In such a regime, access to 
spectrum would be purchased at a price that should 
(theoretically) maximize social benefits. Coase's original 
analysis does not discriminate between primary and secondary 
sharing.  
The spectrum auctions that are used in many countries for 
the initial assignment of spectrum are an attempt to implement 
part of this scheme: those users for whom spectrum is most 
valuable will be willing to pay the most for it. Moreover, those 
organizations that purchase spectrum would have strong 
incentives to make economically efficient tradeoffs between 
spectrum and technology (i.e., modulation, antennas, etc.). 
The regulator cedes to the market the assignment of the 
spectrum, and if the license terms are sufficiently flexible 
(e.g., allow the licensee to choose what the spectrum is to be 
used for), also part of the spectrum allocation decision. 
Because regulatory authorities are likely to be less informed 
than the network operators and users and because the 
regulatory process imposes significant costs, assignment by 
auction is preferred by most economists.
4
 
Price-based access to spectrum, however, is not without 
concerns. Critics have noted, for example, that: 
 Public service entities (eg., police, fire, ambulance) are 
poorly positioned to compete effectively for spectrum 
with commercial entities even though their services 
may be socially very valuable. 
 Valuable new services may not emerge because startup 
firms rarely have the resources to compete for the 
spectrum licenses they need. 
 Price-based spectrum can favor incumbents over new 
entrants because of their (i.e., the incumbents’) superior 
capitalization 
Spectrum managers have developed a variety of approaches 
to address these concerns, including “set asides” for public 
 
4 Regulatory processes impose direct and indirect costs. There are the 
direct costs associated with participation and delay, as well as the indirect 
costs associated with a potential loss of efficiency. The latter costs may arise 
as a consequence of regulatory capture (i.e., the process may be high jacked 
by private interests rather than focused on maximizing social welfare) or 
bureaucratic impediments (e.g., asymmetric information, red tape) that distort 
market behavior and lead to less efficient outcomes. Indeed, a major benefit of 
moving to an auction process (as opposed to assignment by "beauty pagents" 
is that it reduces the risk of regulatory capture and may serve to break to 
logjam of trying to reach a timely regulatory settlement. 
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service entities and small firms. To create the opportunity for 
firms to innovate, regulators have set aside spectrum for which 
users do not require licenses and have provided 
"experimental" licenses in a number of cases.  
While spectrum auctions offer a valuable way to transition 
from a more cumbersome legacy regulatory regime toward 
more market-based mechanisms, auctions only solve the first 
assignment problem. To maintain economically optimal 
spectrum consumption, users need to be able to adjust their 
spectrum holdings based on changes in technologies and 
markets over time. In addition, efficient tradeoffs between 
spectrum and technology can only be made if the current 
valuations of spectrum and technology investments are 
known. One obvious way of providing this capability is to 
have a secondary market for spectrum usage rights (e.g. 
licenses) in which spectrum licenses that have already been 
assigned might be traded in real (or near real) time.
5
 Effective 
secondary markets require a predictable legal framework as 
well as sufficient liquidity on both the supply and demand 
sides of the market [9].  
In the absence of real spectrum markets (i.e., cooperative 
primary sharing), secondary spectrum sharing rises as a 
potential alternative. In this form of DSA, license holders 
contract with secondary users. Cooperative secondary sharing 
offers several advantages over non-cooperative DSA, 
including: 
 More spectrum may become available since primary 
and secondary users could negotiate efficient financial 
payments to allocate the net benefits of enhanced 
spectrum sharing;
6
  
 These systems could use simpler (less expensive) 
radios;
7
 and, 
 More sophisticated sharing arrangements could be 
negotiated.
8
  
The purpose of this paper is to discuss cooperative 
approaches to DSA and to report on the results of research on 
these kinds of systems. The paper will begin by describing 
some of the tradeoffs inherent in different approaches to 
spectrum management. This is not intended to be a detailed 
literature review or a tutorial but rather to situate the 
 
5 The time scale of spectrum trading turns out to be a quite important 
aspect of an effective trading regime. For example, licensed access rights 
might be sub-leased or exchanged for durations of months or years; or, for 
much shorter periods of time measured in seconds to hours. Enabling real-
time trading presents additional technical and mechanism challenges 
associated with keeping the transaction costs of frequent trading manageable 
that are avoided if access rights are assigned for longer duration. However, a 
lack of real-time trading may attenuate the expected benefits of secondary 
spectrum trading.  
6 Primary and secondary users could negotiate "Coasian" bargains to 
allocate the costs (e.g., increased risk of interference for primary users v. 
increased costs for interference avoidance by secondary users) and benefits 
(e.g., capture of otherwise fallow spectrum for expanded usage) of more 
intensive sharing. 
7 The primary and secondary users could mutually agree on an optimal 
interference avoidance strategy. This would likely allow secondary use radios 
to avoid implementing complex sensing and interference avoidance 
technologies. 
8 The full flexibility of negotiated contracts could be employed to allow 
novel technical and business models for sharing spectrum access over time, 
space, and users. 
discussion of dynamic spectrum access in a larger context. 
Then, the attributes of opportunistic use will be described so 
that the contrast with market-based secondary use is clearer. 
The general approach to secondary use will then be described 
along with some recent modeling research results. The paper 
will then describe another approach to DSA based on 
permanent license exchanges, or spectrum trading, along with 
some research results. The paper will conclude with a 
summary and discussion of future directions.   
II. TRADEOFFS IN SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 
Spectrum management is a complex function that is 
typically performed by national governments. Spectrum 
managers must ensure orderly access to the spectrum so that 
the largest number of high value users/usages may share the 
RF frequencies with a minimum of disruptive interference. In 
addition to solving this technical challenge, spectrum 
managers seek ways to balance private rights (that is, the 
rights of the license holders) against public access (that is, the 
ability of new entrants to use spectrum). This particular 
tradeoff is seen in the licensed vs. unlicensed debate.  
More liberalized spectrum management regimes also seek 
to balance the ability to take private action (that is, allow 
licensees to use spectrum for their greatest economic 
advantage) against social goals or public rights. Social goals 
and public rights may include such things as ensuring access 
to diverse points of view to exist in functional democratic 
societies or competitive market structures. Social goals can 
place limits on private action (e.g., license rules may limit the 
re-use of spectrum allocated to broadcasting for mobile 
communications).  
In its effort to balance the interests of different users/uses, 
spectrum managers must recognize that quality of service 
requirements are heterogeneous. Some users may have a very 
low tolerance for in-band interference (e.g., radio telescopes, 
3G mobile operators),
9
 while others may be much more 
tolerant.
10
 Some users may have regular and predictable needs 
for spectrum access (e.g., 3G mobile operators), while others 
may have less-predictable needs (e.g., public safety).
11
 These 
divergent QoS requirements give rise to needs for both 
predictable vs. unpredictable QoS spectrum rights.  
Figure 1 qualitatively relates the range of choices (on a 
continuum from exclusive use to commons), the attributes 
(described above) of the extremes of this continuum and the 
approaches that are being used or proposed. The leftmost side 
 
9 Radio-telescopes are trying to extract information from a very low power 
signal so any additional interference (even low power) may be disruptive. 3G 
mobile operators already use their spectrum much more intensively in dense 
locations to support high usage and so have a lower tolerance for additional 
(unmanaged) sources of interference. 
10 For example, Wi-Fi radios used for best-effort Internet access scale the 
data rate to gracefully accommodate congestion. Ultrawideband devices 
spread the signal over a wide range of frequencies, making them less 
vulnerable to interference in any particular frequency band.  
11 Public safety may have high peak demands at unpredictable locations 
and times; whereas mobile operators (partially as a consequence of how they 
choose to manage their service offerings) may have more regular and 
predictable end-user demands – although with the movement to mobile 
broadband, per-user usage is becoming more bursty and less predictable. 
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of the bottom of the figure represents approaches that use 
licenses. Each approach is a way of acquiring an exclusive 
license to use spectrum, from an administrative approach 
(command and control) to economic ones (auctions and 
spectrum trading). On the right bottom side are the commons 
approaches that involve unlicensed approaches. The middle 
bottom of this figure represent hybrid approaches, such as 
opportunistic use, market based secondary use, mobile virtual 
network operators (MVNOs), etc.  
 
 
Figure 1 -- Spectrum management attributes and technological 
approaches 
 What Figure 1 should make clear is that the choice in 
regimes is a continuum rather than a simple dichotomy 
between property rights on the one hand and commons 
spectrum on the other. Both extremes and everything in 
between have a balance of rules (regulatory) and market-based 
forces that contribute to how spectrum is managed. There is no 
single regime that is best for all situations. Different 
technologies, business models, and market contexts may call 
for different optimal modes of spectrum management, and we 
may expect to see inter-modal competition prospering 
simultaneously over multiple regimes in markets for similar 
services.
12
 
III. NON-COOPERATIVE SECONDARY SHARING 
The approach to spectrum sharing that has dominated the 
technical academic literature has been focused on secondary 
use. This approach requires the use of cognitive radios [5] that 
are capable of detecting spectrum holes, matching them to the 
needs of applications and vacating the spectrum when the 
primary user begins using it again. Akyildiz et.al. provide a 
summary of these radios and their research issues [6].  
A. Challenges with general cognitive radio systems 
To respond to their environment, cognitive radios must 
sense their environment to identify spectrum holes, match the 
spectrum properties to the requirements of the application, 
 
12 Mobile telephony already provides a case in point. We see multiple 
facilities-based operators offering mobile telephone services using a variety of 
wireless technologies (GSM, CDMA, WiMAX) and business models 
(MVNOs, WiFi, traditional service providers), and in competition with other 
technology platforms (wired telephony, over-the-top VoIP). These services 
are provided over a diverse range of frequency bands, managed according to 
the full range of spectrum management regimes (command & control to fully 
flexible licensed to unlicensed spectrum, according to management regimes 
that vary across national sovereign borders).   
tune the radio to this band and continue sensing to determine if 
the primary user is beginning to transmit again. In the most 
general case, this sensing problem is challenging because: 
 The sensing has to be performed over the entire band 
that the radio can be tuned with selectivity equal to the 
minimum usable channel bandwidth. 
 If the primary user’s signal is unknown, then more 
effective matched-filter detection techniques cannot be 
used. 
 Sensing most probably needs to be cooperative to 
overcome the hidden node problem and to define the 
geographic area covered by a potential spectrum hole. 
 Detection has to be rapid, especially when a radio is 
using a band, because it must be vacated with little 
delay when a primary user restarts transmission. 
In addition to sensing challenges, cognitive radios need a 
MAC protocol to coordinate their use of spectrum holes. 
Ongoing sensing can only be done when the radios of 
opportunistic users are off, which means that the spectrum 
hole cannot be used with a 100% duty cycle.  
Combining the inefficiencies due to sensing and MAC-
based contention resolution invites researchers to consider 
alternatives to general opportunistic systems. These 
alternatives include narrowing the scope of the cognitive radio 
problem and considering non-opportunistic approaches. 
B. Defining spectrum holes 
In most cases, the concept of a spectrum hole (i.e., unused 
spectrum in the time, frequency and geospatial dimension) is 
thought of from an FDMA perspective. That is, the systems 
assume that some frequency bandwidth is available for a 
certain time (that is much greater than the time it takes to find, 
evaluate and switch to it) in a certain geographic area. Many 
modern communications systems do not use FDMA; rather 
they use OFDMA (LTE, WiMAX), a variant of TDMA (such 
as GSM) or CDMA (UMTS, CDMA 2000). In these systems, 
defining a “spectrum hole” is more difficult and requires 
coordination between the primary and secondary user [10].  
The degree of coordination depends on the multiple access 
scheme used by the primary user. In OFDMA systems, 
detecting a spectrum hole is much more likely if the sub- 
carriers of the primary user are known, which requires some 
coordination between primary and secondary users (albeit not 
on a real-time or operational level). Exploiting TDMA 
spectrum holes requires time synchronization between the 
primary and secondary user. Finally, CDMA systems require 
code coordination in addition to time synchronization. 
Without this level of coordination, detecting unused (or 
underused) spectrum is difficult.  
C. The special case of television white spaces 
In [2], the US Federal Communications Commission 
approved the operation of cognitive radios in the television 
“white spaces”. Since the location, power levels, channel 
bandwidths and signal strengths of television transmitters are 
known, the white space detection problem is simplified 
considerably. The white spaces are used by wireless 
microphones, so sensing is still necessary. By permitted 
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unlicensed operation in white spaces, the FCC opted for a 
blend between non-cooperative primary use and non-
cooperative secondary use. It is a blend between these because 
the secondary use is from an allocation perspective but not an 
assignment perspective in that the white space devices 
(WSDs) do not use otherwise licensed spectrum. Thus, the 
WSDs appear as primary users of unassigned spectrum that 
has been allocated to television service but has either not been 
assigned or is not being used. 
In any case, WSDs must have a MAC protocol (e.g., [11]) 
to share the spectrum among competing users. They may also 
need to engage in cooperative sensing, meaning that there may 
need to be a communication channel among them. 
D. Implications for efficient spectrum use 
Non-cooperative secondary sharing beyond FDMA systems 
requires a degree of coordination that is unlikely to be found 
in opportunistic systems that are based on the current models 
of sensing. Thus, spectrum that might otherwise be open to 
sharing would remain undetected by cognitive radios and thus 
remain unused. Cooperative approaches make spectrum that is 
technologically “hidden” open for sharing.  
IV. COOPERATIVE SECONDARY SHARING 
Non-cooperative secondary sharing allows for the 
emergence of a relatively decentralized access system. This 
approach requires either a cognitive radio or one that has a 
“white spaces” database that determines its operating 
parameters (see, for example [12]). For the foreseeable future, 
cognitive radios will be costly and will consume considerable 
energy, making mobility challenging, especially for handsets. 
Sensing-based systems will almost certainly require 
cooperative sensing to overcome the hidden terminal problem 
and to establish the geographic perimeter of spectrum holes, 
which adds to radio overhead. Finally, non-cooperative 
secondary sharing requires a MAC protocol to mediate among 
competing secondary users, which also imposes overhead. 
Many of these problems can be ameliorated if secondary 
usage is cooperative. If the primary user is directly involved in 
the secondary use decision, then there is no longer a unilateral 
need for sensing or for a MAC protocol for the secondary use 
radios. This makes it possible to design secondary use radios 
that are less costly and more energy efficient. Spectrum that 
might be “hidden” in TDMA, CDMA or OFDMA systems can 
be made available because the closer coordination that is 
required can be negotiated. The primary and secondary users 
can negotiate over the optimal allocation of interference 
avoidance costs and benefits from increased sharing. Finally, 
the primary user may be willing to open spectrum that they 
might otherwise seek to protect (e.g., by sending null signals 
during idle periods) because: 
 The primary user can exercise control over the QoS they 
offer to their users, and, 
 The primary user can negotiate financial incentives to 
open spectrum to secondary users.  
Given these advantages, why is there less attention being 
paid to cooperative secondary sharing than to non-cooperative 
sharing? 
A.  Research Questions 
The research literature on cooperative secondary sharing is 
relatively sparse but is growing. Some research questions that 
arise include: 
 What is the structure of the incentives for primary users 
(license-holders) to share spectrum with (potential) 
secondary users? 
 Under what circumstances would users choose secondary 
use from their array of communications options? How is 
this affected by the particular frequency band, 
geographical constraints and access technology? 
 Are cooperative secondary use approaches more efficient 
(technically, economically, and/or politically) than non-
cooperative approaches? 
 What are the implications of different approaches to 
negotiating cooperative agreements (eg., markets, bi-
lateral negotiations, etc.)? 
 What are the implications of different access technologies 
(eg. FDMA, TDMA, CDMA, OFDM) on secondary 
sharing behavior? 
 What kinds of strategic behaviors might we expect among 
primary and secondary usage, and how might the 
deleterious behaviors be ameliorated? 
 What users, applications and business models are most 
likely to find cooperative sharing attractive?  
 What other changes are needed in radio design to make 
flexible spectrum sharing contracts easier to negotiate 
(e.g., standardization?) and enforce? 
 What changes in regulatory policy are needed to foster 
and facilitate efficient cooperative sharing? What 
concerns may cooperative sharing raise for antitrust or 
asymmetric bargaining power? 
B. Research Results 
There is a growing literature seeking to model DSA 
secondary use sharing regimes and the potential benefits its 
promises. Weiss [3] pointed out that some kinds of 
cooperative secondary use (Type I) already exist in practice in 
the form of MVNO agreements, which are the result of 
bilateral negotiations. This suggests (1) that incentives for 
primary and secondary users exist and (2) that different types 
of sharing might result in different negotiating mechanisms.In 
[13], Chapin and Lehr provide a high level view on 
approaches to sharing and in [14], they suggest changes in 
radio design to promote access by new entrants.  In [15] Lehr 
and Jesuale discuss an approach to moving toward cooperative 
sharing.    
Peha and Panichpapiboon [16] considered the incentives 
that a primary user (license holder) would have in sharing 
spectrum to secondary users. They showed that, for GSM 
operators, strong incentives to allow secondary use exist since 
license holders can monetize otherwise idle spectrum. 
Grandblaise et.al. [17] report on the results of the E
2
R 
research project. They consider spectrum sharing between 
system operators as well as between operators and end users. 
They build a model based on recurrent auctions to determine 
the efficiency gain of a DSA system assuming profit-
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maximizing operators/users. Potential users bid for spectrum 
usage rights based on their projected needs (and revenues) for 
the next period. Grandblaise et al. show that different 
spectrum assignment approaches apply at different 
combinations of traffic load and per-cell blocking 
probabilities. DSA approaches are most effective for low to 
moderate load levels whilst fixed spectrum assignment is more 
effective at higher load levels. 
Tonmukayakul and Weiss [18] studied the behavior of 
potential secondary users in a market-based negotiating 
system using agent-based computational economics. In their 
model, users could choose between acquiring a license, 
purchasing secondary use rights on a market or using 
unlicensed spectrum. Their model included QoS factors as 
well as the possibility of opportunistic behavior for both 
primary and secondary users. Figure 2 is an example of the 
results of this model. 
 
Figure 2 -- Secondary use in a synthetic market 
In this figure (taken from [19]), each of the clusters of bars 
represent cell sizes, and the pairs of bars in each cluster 
represent user sensitivity to interference. The left side of each 
pair of bars (not cross-hatched) represents the condition where 
secondary use does not exist and the right, cross-hatched 
section describes user choices with secondary use. So, for 
example, if we take a 500m cell with u=3.0, the simulation 
results indicate that approximately 60% of potential secondary 
users choose unlicensed if no secondary use exists, while this 
number becomes approximately 40% if secondary use exists. 
The demand for licenses among secondary users disappears in 
all scenarios in the presence of secondary use under this set of 
modeling parameters
13
. Note that users in environments 
characterized by small cells are more likely to choose 
unlicensed use because the interference is lower.  
 Al Daoud et al. [20] studied pricing in cooperative 
secondary sharing without particular attention to the technical 
coordination requirements of CDMA. The main objective in 
selecting CDMA was to focus on pricing without requiring the 
total absence of interference. Thus, they are able to define 
prices based on the induced interference. They show that 
profits are improved when interference-based pricing is 
introduced when compared with a simpler, flat pricing 
scheme. 
 
13 Note that demand for licenses would still exist for primary users, though 
this is not in the scope of the model 
V. COOPERATIVE PRIMARY SHARING 
DSA need not be limited to temporary transfers of rights as 
is the case in cooperative secondary sharing. If markets are 
sufficiently frictionless, then a scenario that is equally viable 
is one in which spectrum usage rights are purchased as needed 
and sold when they are no longer needed. That is, a secondary 
market for spectrum licenses.
14
  
Spectrum trading has been discussed in the academic 
literature for some time. The tradeoffs involved have been 
summarized by the OECD [21]. Spectrum trading offers some 
advantages over both dedicated unlicensed or secondary use. 
These include: 
 There is no need to negotiate geographical, temporal, 
spectral or air interface parameters since licenses are 
transferred; 
 Interference is subject to regular interference regulations; 
 No negotiation protocol need be established; and,  
 Software radios are technologically adequate (i.e., the 
added complexity of cognitive radio-driven sensing and 
active avoidance is not required). 
But there are numerous challenges that need to be addressed 
as well, including: 
 Will spectrum markets be sufficiently liquid and 
frictionless on both the supply and demand side? 
 Since spectrum at different frequencies (and 
locations/times) is not fungible, how can a tradable 
commodity be constructed? 
 How can inefficient fragmentation of a spectrum band be 
avoided? 
 How should a market be administered? Should the 
government or a third-party spectrum broker be in 
charge?  
 What regulatory interventions may be required? What are 
the cost/consequences of those interventions? 
 What are the tradeoffs involved in the trading 
architectures chosen (eg. Broker vs. market vs. auction)? 
Although often discussed, additional research is needed to 
understand how such a secondary market to enable primary 
sharing might operate in practice. Caiecedo and Weiss [22] 
have constructed a model using agent-based computational 
economics. They focused on studying the boundaries of 
viability in spectrum trading markets. They found that, given 
their modeling parameters, that a minimum of six active 
market participants were necessary, and that the amount of 
spectrum available for trading had to be calibrated to the 
traffic that this spectrum needed to carry (albeit with an error 
tolerance of +/- 50%).  
Yoon [23] performed a comparative study of different 
trading mechanisms (i.e., broker-based, auctions and direct 
trading). Her study found that provider’s profits were superior 
under auctions while the subscriber’s surplus was constant 
across all trading mechanisms. However, when considering 
 
14 The market is a secondary market in the same sense that the stock 
exchange is a secondary market. In equities, the primary market is the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) whereas in spectrum the primary market would be an 
auction or beauty contest.  
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the dynamic trading behavior under this mechanism, the 
research found that a large incumbent could monopolize 
spectrum in the absence of regulation. Using spectrum caps 
can address concentration, but this work does not address the 
possible deadweight losses associated with this intervention. 
Yoon's model suggests that direct trading provides a more 
active market with or without regulation. Finally, she 
considers market scenarios and business models related to 
secondary use and secondary markets.  
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
Much of the attention in the technical literature has been on 
improving the functions of cognitive radios for non-
cooperative secondary sharing. The purpose of this paper is to: 
 situate that work in the broader context of dynamic 
spectrum access,  
 introduce readers to research in the cooperative sharing 
domain, and,  
 point out future research that would be valuable in this 
cooperative sharing domain. 
This research requires substantial knowledge of both the 
underlying technology models as well as economic and 
business models.  
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